Security

The FSB framework does not currently include a standalone security target. The TPA Cross-Border Working Group proposes that a future framework should do so.

TPA Cross-Border Working Group in collaboration with:

Security should be treated as an outcome in its own right, not simply as a constraint on making payments faster and more accessible.

The 2021 framework contains no standalone security target. Security appears primarily as a condition attached to other objectives, most notably the requirement that greater speed should not compromise AML/CFT, fraud or other necessary compliance checks.

This treats security as a baseline to preserve rather than an outcome against which progress should be measured.

The case for revisiting that approach has strengthened. Faster payments reduce the time available to detect and stop fraud, while expanding access introduces new authentication and monitoring challenges.

At the same time, cross-border fraud exposes gaps that individual institutions cannot address alone, including information sharing, account verification and the tracing and recovery of funds across jurisdictions.

The case for a standalone security target

As with the existing target areas, security lacks a single, readily available dataset against which progress can be measured. Any future target would also need to define clearly what security encompasses. In cross-border payments, three areas are particularly relevant:

  • End-user fraud: including authorised push-payment scams and misdirected payments.
  • Financial-crime integrity: including AML/CFT and sanctions controls.
  • Operational and cyber resilience: Protecting the infrastructure and systems through which payments move.

These risks should not be treated as a single measure of security. A future framework should distinguish between payment fraud and misdirection, financial-crime controls, and operational and cyber resilience, with separate measures appropriate to each.

Each requires different measures and involves different actors. Potential metrics include:

Payee/account verification

Measure: The share of relevant payments subject to confirmation of payee, account-name matching or an equivalent pre-execution verification control.

Why it matters: This provides an observable measure of preventative controls designed to reduce fraudulent or misdirected payments before funds move.

Cross-border fund recovery

Measure: The proportion of funds reported as fraudulently transferred that are successfully traced and returned across borders.

Why it matters: Fund recovery is a specifically cross-border challenge requiring cooperation between institutions and jurisdictions. Measurement would, however, depend on consistent definitions and reporting standards.

Key statistic

No dedicated security targets despite growing fraud threat

Fragmented liability and oversight, complex fund recovery processes, and limited data sharing make security of growing importance in cross-border payments. Any program which pushes for faster and more accessible cross-border payments must also recognise the subsequent elevated fraud risk and incentivise security measures accordingly.

71%

of the total value of card fraud involving EU/EEA-issued cards was cross-border in the first half of 2023. Source: ECB and EBA, 2024 Report on Payment Fraud.

What needs to change

Security weaknesses in cross-border payments are rarely confined to a single institution or payment rail. Fraud can originate in one jurisdiction, move through infrastructure in another and reach an account in a third, while responsibility for detection, intervention and recovery is divided between different participants.

This makes security partly a coordination problem. Faster screening within individual institutions will help, but so will the ability to verify recipients before funds move, share intelligence across borders and act quickly when fraud is identified. As cross-border payments become faster and more interconnected, these capabilities become increasingly important.

The interventions that follow focus on two areas where greater coordination could have the greatest effect: fraud-data sharing and fund recovery, and more effective compliance and screening.

Available solutions

Cross-border security depends on institutions being able to identify risk, share intelligence and act before funds become irrecoverable.

The following interventions address two key weaknesses: fragmented fraud intelligence and friction in compliance screening.

Cross-border fraud intelligence and fund recovery

Structured data sharing can help institutions identify emerging fraud more quickly, while agreed recovery mechanisms can support the freezing, tracing and return of funds across jurisdictions.

Improves:

Security

Key dependency:

Effective collaboration requires legal gateways for data sharing, common fraud definitions and broad institutional participation. Recovery also depends on cooperation in the beneficiary jurisdiction and rapid intervention.

In practice:

Domestic recall mechanisms provide a potential model for cross-border cooperation, allowing institutions to flag receiving accounts, request freezes and coordinate the recovery of funds.

Modernised compliance and screening

Better data, risk-based controls and AI/ML-supported screening can reduce false positives and prioritise genuinely suspicious activity for investigation.

Improves:

Security · Speed · Cost

Key dependency:

Effectiveness depends on data quality, regulatory acceptance, explainability and robust model-risk governance. Screening also remains dependent on the quality of underlying sanctions and payment data.

In practice:

HSBC reports a 60% reduction in false positives following implementation of its AI-driven Dynamic Risk Assessment system, illustrating the potential to reduce manual review while accelerating legitimate payments.

Confirmation of payee and pre-validation

Pre-validation checks beneficiary information before submission. This can include name matching, account validity and reachability, and validation of identifiers such as IBANs. Problems can therefore be corrected at origination rather than after a payment fails or is misdirected.

Improves:

Cost · Speed · Transparency · Security

Key dependency:

Checks depend on access to reliable beneficiary-side data. Cross-border coverage remains fragmented and relies on receiving banks, directories or APIs being able and willing to respond.

In practice:

Swift Payment Pre-validation allows participating banks to check beneficiary details before sending a payment. Domestic Confirmation of Payee schemes provide a more mature model for name matching, although extending that approach across jurisdictions requires interoperability between systems.

Solutions in practice

How TPA members are applying technology and shared intelligence to detect and prevent cross-border payment fraud.

Real-time fraud monitoring across borders

Across the programmes Enfuce processes, nine in ten confirmed fraud transactions occur when cardholders pay outside their home market, predominantly through card-not-present channels.

The Enfuce Bureau of Investigation (EBI) provides real-time fraud monitoring across more than 60 issuers, combining machine learning with expert analyst oversight. Featurespace’s ARIC behavioural analytics scores each authorisation for anomalies, while detection logic is refined by analysts and shared across the portfolio. More than 409 million authorisations were monitored over the past 12 months.

During the same period, EBI declined more than €18 million in suspected fraudulent transactions at the point of authorisation. The model demonstrates how real-time monitoring and shared detection logic can help identify cross-border fraud before transactions result in losses, chargebacks or disputes.

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